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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Economic development is uneven over space. Regions are characterized by performance 
disparities in factor productivity: some regions are ahead, whereas others lag behind. The 
economic literature has stressed two main explanations, both relating to the firms’ location 
decision: endowments and externalities.1 
 
Locational advantages result from differences in endowments between regions. While some 
attributes are present (possibly in abundance) in some regions, they are not present in other 
regions. Producers who value particular features will concentrate in locations with more of 
these attributes. This first explanation highlights that firms prefer to be near their inputs, 
either natural endowments (the presence of raw materials, access to sea, etc.) or local non 
traded infrastructure (roads, equipment in industrial parks, etc.). In any case, the effects of 
these two inputs mutually interact. Paraphrasing Lall, Shalizi and Deichman (2001), the 
benefits of a coastal location can be enhanced by the development of efficient seaports, and 
the costs of being landlocked can be reduced by investments in communication infrastructure, 
linking the hinterland to regions with access to harbours. 
 
In addition, the concentration of economic activity is due to externalities. The literature 
distinguishes pecuniary externalities and production externalities. The former are analysed in 
the “new economic geography” models. Consumers are assumed to prefer a diversity of 
goods. To satisfy them, firms produce differentiated products in a setting of monopolistic 
competition and in the presence of increasing returns to scale and transportation costs (see, for 
example, Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Pecuniary externality models stress the strict preference of 
firms to be close to their customers and vice-versa.  
 
Conversely, production externalities refer to the benefits to firms of proximity to other firms. 
These agglomeration economies are external to the firms. Following Marshall (1920) and 
Hoover (1936), it is now customary to consider two categories of production externalities. 
The co-location of firms engaged in similar activities generates so-called localization 
externalities2. These intra-industry benefits are notably attributable to knowledge spillovers 
(by observing neighbouring firms and learning about what they are doing, firms acquire tacit 
and codified knowledge), a larger pool of specialized labour (there may be gains from 
locating in a “thick” labour market), and opportunities for efficient subcontracting. On the 
demand side, consumers take advantage of the reduction of information asymmetries and of a 
better quality/price ratio due to increased competition between suppliers. Of course, the 
benefits of own-industry concentration can be offset by negative externalities, such as the 
increased costs of labour, land and transport due to congestion. The empirical literature 
supports the presence of net positive effects from localization economies (see, for example, 
Ciccone and Hall, 1996 or Henderson, 2003). In addition, some benefits are expected from 
locating in close proximity to firms in other industries. These externalities arise from the scale 
or diversity of local activity outside the own-industry, involving a sort of cross-fertilization 
between firms (Henderson, 2003). They are called urbanization economies3 and are due to 
easier access to complementary services (advertising, specialized financial services, and 
                                                          
1 See for example LaFountain (2002). 
2 Alternatively, in a dynamic context, Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992) refer to these externalities 
as Marshall, Arrow, Romer (MAR) externalities. 
3 In a dynamic context, Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992) refer to these externalities as Jacobs 
(1969) externalities. 
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publishing), and to a larger labour pool with multiple skills, as well as to inter-industry 
information exchanges and the availability of less-costly general infrastructure (Lall, Shalizi 
and Deichman, 2001). Again, these economies can be compensated for by costs such as 
increases in land rents and wage rates or commuting times for workers. Although the 
literature is not unanimous (see Henderson, 2003), since Sveikauskas (1975) evidence of net 
positive urbanization economies is most often reported.  
 
The agglomeration process generates a snowball effect. A location with a high demand for a 
good attracts new producers, which in turn require additional employees. Workers can expect 
higher wages and a higher demand is then expressed for all goods at that location, making the 
region more attractive to other firms. 
 
Whatever reasons are at work – differences in locational endowments and/or externalities – a 
unit of capital is expected to be diversely productive according to the region where it is 
installed. In addition, spatial disparities in land rents and wages are not bid away by firms and 
individuals in search of low cost or high income locations (see Henderson, Shalizi and 
Venables, 2001). 
 
Regional policies have long been implemented in most industrialized countries with the 
purpose of achieving a better balance in the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
Generally speaking, regional policy relies on instruments that can be classified into two broad 
categories. The first range of instruments is aimed at directly increasing regional productivity 
by improving physical infrastructure (roads, telecommunications capabilities, etc.), human 
capital (education) or immaterial assets (R&D, consulting, etc.). The second category of 
instruments is more specifically designed to lessen the costs of factors by granting firms 
various capital (or labour) subsidies, providing fiscal incentives or lowering corporate tax 
rates. 
 
A relevant question is whether the policy instruments are effective to offset a productivity 
handicap. In this paper, I focus particularly on the investment decision and on regional 
policies aimed at promoting capital formation in backward regions. I leave aside the 
instruments that affect other factors of production (the labour subsidies, for example). The 
purpose of this paper is to determine analytically to what extent some of the instruments 
(public capital stocks, capital grants, fiscal incentives and corporate tax cuts) must be 
implemented in order to make up for an unfavourable differential of productivity. The 
productive handicap that is common in lagging regions is considered to result from 
differences in agglomeration economies or in regional endowments. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basis model. A general expression is 
given that links together the cost of capital, investment incentives, public infrastructure, local 
endowments and agglomeration economies. By totally differentiating this expression, Section 
III determines analytically how high a particular instrument (an increase in a publicly 
provided input, a decrease of the tax base or of the corporate tax rate, or a capital subsidy) 
must be in order to offset an unfavourable differential of productivity. A numerical 
application is then developed in order to illustrate the approach and its relevance. Section IV 
addresses the question of the public cost associated with different instruments of regional 
policy in order to compare their relative performance. Section V concludes. 
 
 
II. THE BASIS MODEL 
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The private output in a region r is produced according to the following production function 
[1]: 
 
[1]    r
α
r
r
rrr H)a
K)(G,F(K=Y  
 
This expression is made up of three components. Since I am concentrating on the capital 
formation decision,4 the first term is a function F that combines privately owned capital, Kr, 
and a publicly provided input, Gr. The latter term refers to any public spending (services to 
enterprises, maintenance or setting up of infrastructure) that is under the control of 
government and that affects the firms’ productivity. Following Garcia-Milà and McGuire 
(2001), Gr, is supposed to be “distributed to firms in proportion to their capital stock” so that 
the contribution of publicly provided inputs to the marginal productivity in region r is equal to 
[2]: 
 
[2]    
rG
r
r F'
K
G  
 
  
where F’Gr represents the partial derivative of the function F with respect to the quantity of 
publicly provided goods, Gr, in region  r. Production in jurisdiction r is not only determined by 
F but also by two other factors respectively linked to agglomeration economies and to 
endowment differences between regions.5  
 
The first factor, (Kr/ar)α, is supposed to capture any productivity increase due to a greater 
concentration of private capital, which arises from attempts to benefit from proximity either to 
the output market (as in pecuniary externality models), or to other firms in the same industry 
(to take advantage of the specialized know-how, with reference to localization externalities), 
or to firms in other industries (in order to exploit higher diversity and the mass effect, in 
relation to urbanization externalities). With reference to Ciccone and Hall (1996), K/a 
expresses the density ratio of private capital in an acre of space (symbolized by a) and α 
indicates the elasticity of output to density.  
 
The second factor, Hr, is a Hicks-neutral shifter term that focuses any efficiency differential 
over space that would be due to factors out of the control of the firm and of the public sector. 
It encompasses any locational advantage (or disadvantage) due to natural endowments (any 
gift of nature) or attributable to any inter-regional spillover effects. Whereas agglomeration 
economies due to information diffusion are known to decrease sharply with distance (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993) and, accordingly, are expected to produce no inter-regional 
spillover effect, the same is not true for some public infrastructure that may significantly 
affect private output outside the region where it is installed. Pereira and Roca-Sagales (2003) 
                                                          
4 All other arguments (notably labour, land and raw materials) are suppressed for simplicity. 
5 That may not be totally reflected in factor prices so that market outcomes could be inefficient. 
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have given prominence to important spillover effects in Spain, with some regions benefiting 
greatly from public inputs being located elsewhere.6  
 
Through agglomeration economies, each firm’s decision affects all firms outputs, including its 
own in the region. Following Garcia-Milà and McGuire (2002), none of the firms is assumed 
to take this into account.7 At the optimum, each firm chooses its capital stock so as to equalize 
the marginal contributions to production in value8 and the marginal cost of capital, as 
indicated in [3]: 
 
[3]  [ ])π-(δ+)π-(ρ
τ-1
)A-(1=H)
a
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Krrjr
r
r
r
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The right hand side of equality [3] is the well-known expression of the gross-of-depreciation 
capital cost (see King and Fullerton, 1984). As Alworth commented, “it captures in addition 
to the financial cost, all other features of the tax system which might affect the investment 
decision of the firm, including depreciation allowance and a wide number of possible indirect 
investment incentives” (Alworth, 1988). It expresses the before-tax minimum rate of return 
that an investment project must yield in order to provide the saver with the expected net-of-
tax return and to account for the loss of capital value due to depreciation. In this expression, πr 
and πKr respectively symbolize the expected inflation rate for goods sold by the firm and the 
real expected inflation rate on capital goods,9 δ is the exponential rate of economic 
depreciation,10 ρjr is the financial cost, τr is the corporate tax rate11 and Ar is the present 
discounted value of any capital grant, tax credit or tax savings due to the allowances permitted 
for the asset, when the cost of the project is unity. In expression [3], all variables are possibly 
different between regions (they are noted with the subscript r) except δ that is supposed to be 
similar in each region.12 
                                                          
6 Some network infrastructure such as highways or telecommunications for example, is expected to have 
important spillover effects. Positive spillover effects are not necessarily expected from some local ports or 
regional airports. 
7 The aggregate amount of private capital is taken as a constant, when a firm makes its choice of capital and 
labour (see Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2001). 
8 This is the gain to the firm from hiring an additional unit of capital. It is due to the marginal product of capital, 
F’Kr , and to the marginal output from the increase in the publicly provided input, (Gr/Kr)F’Gr (see Oates and 
Schwab, 1991). It is also attributable to any locational (dis)advantage, Hr(Kr/ar)α . 
9 P is the price of output and PK is the price of investment goods. πK is equal to 
..
PPk −  where a dot over the 
letter indicates its rate of change. 
10 (δ−πk) expresses the effective economic depreciation rate accounting for the expected capital gain on capital 
goods if .
..
PPk f  The literature generally states that δ is equal to 2/Le, where Le is the economic life of the 
asset. 
11 When the investment is cross-border, τ becomes a composite tax rate including the source and home countries 
statutory tax rates on corporations, as well as any dividend withholding taxes, and taking into account the 
different methods for relieving double taxation. 
12 The loss of value due to economic depreciation is clearly expected to be the same wherever the asset is 
located. By and large, in this paper, the object is to compare the productivity of some neighbouring regions in a 
larger administrative entity. Accordingly, I shall consider that the variables concerning the general environment 
are identical for all regions. Notably, this is the case for the financing mix or, by assumption, for the general 
rules determining the proportions of the investment expenditure qualifying for tax allowances, which is entitled 
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The financial cost, ρjr, is the rate at which the firm discounts after-tax cash flows. It differs 
according to the source of finance, j.13 Since nominal interest payments are tax deductible for 
the company, the financial cost for debt finance is ρDr = (1-τr) ir where ir is the interest rate. If 
ψr expresses the nominal after-tax rate of return required by existing shareholders on retained 
earnings, the financial cost of retaining profits ρRrt is equal to ψrt/ (1-mgr) where mgr is the 
shareholders’ personal tax rate on capital gains (transformed into an effective rate on 
accruals). If one assumes that σr is the required return to new shareholders (which may differ 
from ψr for generality), the financial cost associated with a new shares issue ρSr becomes [σr 
+ πr (mgr-1+[1-mdr]θr) ] /  θr[1-mdr], where θr denotes the opportunity cost of retained earnings 
in terms of gross dividends foregone and and mdr symbolizes the personal tax rate on dividend 
remittances [See King and Fullerton (1984) and Boadway and Shah (1995)]. θr is higher than 
1 when methods of alleviating the economic double taxation of dividends (the imputation 
regime, for instance) are implemented.14 The term (mgr-1+[1-mdr]θr) is representative of the 
net tax penalty attributable to the fact that a purely nominal return is taxed but escapes from 
any capital gain tax. King and Fullerton (1984) consider an arbitrage mechanism in such a 
way that the saver is indifferent between the three financing choices. In order to obtain this 
result the authors impose that ψr = σr + πr (mgr-1 + [1-mdr]θr) = (1-mir) ir where mir is the 
personal tax on interest. 
 
Expressions [4a],  [4b] and [4c] summarize the financial costs for the three sources of finance: 
 
[4a]   r)i-1( rDr τρ =  when the investment is financed by debt; 
[4b] 
)m-(1
)-1(
gr
rir
Rr
im=ρ
 
when the firm uses retained earnings; and 
[4c] 
r
r
Sr
i
θρ )m-1(
)m-1(
dr
ir=  for new share issues. 
 
If β is the fraction of the investment that is financed by debt, (1-β) is the proportion of equity 
finance, and ε is the proportion of equity finance from new share issues, the financial cost mix 
is provided by: 
  
[4d] ]
)m-(1
)im-(1
ε)-(1+
)θm-(1
)im-(1
β)[ε-(1+)iτ-β(1=ρ
gr
rir
rdr
rir
rrmr  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to immediate expensing or on which a capital subsidy can be granted. Of course, the degree of public generosity, 
the grant rate, for example, may vary between regions. 
13 The expressions for the financial cost are more complicated when one considers cross-border financing. See 
Alworth (1988). 
14 Under the classical system of corporation tax, the tax liability of a company is independent of that of its 
shareholders. No corporate tax is refunded when dividends are paid out, so the value of θ is unity. The two-rate 
system is the first method for allowing tax relief on dividends. Distributed profits are taxed at a lower corporate 
rate, τ, than retained earnings, which are taxed at the rate, τR. In this case, θ = (1+ τ- τR)-1. With the dividend 
deduction system, companies are allowed to deduct x percent of gross dividends from the tax base. In this case, θ 
becomes equal to (1-xτR)-1. Finally, with an imputation system, a part of the company’s tax bill, say c, is imputed 
to the stockholders. θ is equal to (1-c)-1. When full integration is granted, θ becomes equal to (1-τ)-1 [See 
Alworth (1988) and King and Fullerton (1984)]. 
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The left-hand side of expression [3] captures the productive contribution in value of one 
monetary unit of capital and the meaning of Hr has been explained above. (Pr/PKr)F’Kr and 
(Pr/PKr)(Gr/Kr)F’Gr respectively measure the marginal productivity of private capital and the 
marginal increase of output due to public inputs, in region r. Both terms are expressed in 
value per monetary unit. 
 
 
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
 
Expression [3] can be rewritten as follows: 
 
[5]  Grrkrjr
r
r
r
r
rrK FAa
KHC ')]()[(1
1)(1 −−+−−
−= −− πδπρτ
α  
 
where CKr = (Pr/PKr) F’Kr is the gross cost of capital in region r and F’Gr expresses the output 
increase in region r due to any augmentation of publicly provided input. F’Gr is equal to 
(PrGr/PKrKr) F’Gr.  
 
Following King and Fullerton (1984), public (regional) incentives may take one of three 
following forms: depreciation allowances, f1Adrτr, immediate expensing or any other device 
aimed at decreasing the tax base, f2τr, and capital grants, f3sr. 
 
[6]  Ar = f1Adrτr + f2τr + f3sr 
 
where f1, f2 and f3 respectively express the proportions of investment expenditure qualifying 
for standard depreciation allowances, immediate expensing and grants. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that f1, f2 and f3 are identical whatever the region may be. Adrτr is the 
present discounted value of tax savings from depreciation allowances; and sr is the rate of 
capital grant, net of any corporate tax. Immediate expensing and tax allowances are devices 
that are expected to produce a similar effect on tax savings for an identical shock (an equal 
variation of f2 and of f1Adr). The former can take any continuous value. By contrast, the latter 
refers to different patterns such as straight line, declining balance or other schemes allowed 
for tax depreciation, that yield discontinuous present values in terms of tax exemption. For the 
sake of simplicity, in the remainder of the paper I shall consider that any variation of f2 in 
region r (df2r) is assumed to capture any (continuous) modification of the tax base due to 
immediate expensing or tax allowance regimes. 
 
By and large, public authorities use these fiscal (df2r) and financial (dsr) channels to stimulate 
investment in lagging regions. Regional policy relies on two further instruments: lowering the 
corporate tax scale15 and financing public services to enterprises or infrastructure. What 
regional policy must be implemented in order to make up for an unfavourable differential of 
productivity? This question may be analytically addressed by examining how the gross capital 
cost is affected by the four following strategies: lowering the corporate tax rate, dτr, 
decreasing the tax base, df2r, granting a capital subsidy, dsr, and providing public inputs, dGr. 
Expression [7] gives the total differential of CKr. It measures the sensitivity of the capital cost 
                                                          
15 Temporary tax reductions on the corporate income, such as tax holidays, are a commonly used instrument in 
some regions. 
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with respect to these economic policies and to a variation of any productivity differential due 
to regional disparities either in externalities or endowments. 
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From [7], it is easy to calculate the extent to which a particular policy is necessary to 
compensate a regional productivity deficit. In other words, I intend to measure the required 
variation in policy instruments dτr, df2r, dsr and dGr that maintain a constant capital cost (dCKr 
= 0), notwithstanding the productivity differential. 
 
[8a]   α
α
τ
τ )/([])/([ rrr
r
Kr
rrr
Kr
r aKHdC
aKH
C
d
∂
∂
∂
∂
=  
 
[8b]   ])/([])/([
2
2
α
α
rrr
r
Kr
rrr
Kr
r aKHd
f
C
aKH
C
df
∂
∂
∂
∂
=   
 
[8c]   ])/([])/([ α
α
rrr
r
Kr
rrr
Kr
r aKHd
s
C
aKH
C
ds
∂
∂
∂
∂
=   
 
[8d]   [ ]αα )/(])/([ rrr
r
Kr
rrr
Kr
r aKHd
G
C
aKH
C
dG
∂
∂
∂
∂
=    
 
 
What alternative policies (dτr, df2r, dsr and dGr) are required to offset a handicap in the 
productivity of a region r? In order to answer this question, we must solve each section of 
expression [8] to obtain the analytical expressions of dτr*, df2r*, dsr* and dGr*. When an 
asterisk is associated with a policy variable, it indicates that the instrument exactly makes up 
for a regional productivity differential equal to



 α)
ra
rK(rHd /
α)
ra
rK(
r
H . Let us notice that this 
term is negative when the region faces a productivity handicap.  
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III.1. The analytical expressions of dτr*, df2r*, dsr* and dGr* 
 
 
After some transformations, one obtains the expressions [9] to [12]: 
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where rÝ τρ ∂jr , rdrA τ∂∂ and some intermediary derivatives are detailed in the Appendix.  
 
In order to offset an unfavourable productivity differential in region r, public authorities have 
to modify the corporate tax rate by dτr*, as shown in expression [9]. The extent of dτr* is a 
result of the product of the following two factors.  
1. First, the productivity handicap that is to be compensated, 



 α)
ra
rK(rHd /
α)
ra
rK(
r
H ; and 
2. Second, the inverse of the tax base on which the corporate tax is calculated. This tax base 
is obtained by algebraic summation of three terms: the required profit before corporate tax 
that yields one euro after tax, 1/(1-τr), adjusted to take into account the expected effect of 
the variation of the corporate tax rate on the financial cost, 
( rÝ τρ ∂jr )/ )--( Krr πδπρ +jr , and on tax savings from immediate expensing and tax 
allowances, -
rrrdr
rdrrdr
sA
AA
321
12
f-f-f-1
)]([ff
ττ
ττ ∂∂++
. 
 
In regard to df2r*, dsr* and dGr*, expressions [10] to [12] indicate the extent to which tax 
incentives, capital subsidies or publicly provided inputs have to be implemented to offset a 
regional productivity handicap. 
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Expressions [10] and [11] can be easily interpreted in the same way as [9]. The second factor 
expresses the corporate tax burden on which fiscal incentives are applied in [10] and the 
proportion of the asset qualifying for grants in [11], both being expressed by net euro 
invested.16  In expression [12], the last term indicates the after-corporate-tax additional output 
from the increase in the publicly provided input, taking into account the productivity 
differential, per net euro invested.  
A numerical example will help us go further in the analysis.  
 
 
III.2. A numerical example  
 
 
In order to illustrate the approach and its relevance, I shall consider the following scenario. 
The tax parameters are as simple as possible: a corporate tax rate, τ, is in force for distributed 
profits as well as for retained earnings and there is no double tax relief for dividends (the 
system is classical, with θ = 1). The corporate (τ) and personal (mi, mg, md) tax rates are close 
to those used in some European countries or recommended by the European Commission 
(2001) or are used in some European countries and the pattern allowed for tax depreciation is 
the straight-line method. In this starting scenario, neither special fiscal provisions (such as a 
tax credit, f2) nor discretionary public aid (such as a capital grant, sr) is considered. The 
investment is financed in equal portions by debt, undistributed profits and new share issue. 
The parameters characterizing the productivity disparities over space are calibrated so as to be 
neutral: Hr(Kr/ar)α  is put equal to unity. The value assigned to the ratio Gr/Kr comes from a 
statistical observation in the occidental economies and that attributed to F’Gr is inspired by 
Pereira and Roca-Sagales (2003). 
More precisely, the parameters take the values presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The value of parameters in the starting scenario 
 
The general tax parameters 
f1 f2 f3 sr L τr mir mgr mdr θr 
1 0 1 0 10 0.33 0.15 0 0.25 1 
 
The parameters determining productivity disparity over space  
Hr (Kr/ ar)α Gr/Kr F’Gr 
1 0.04 0.085* 
* This is the arithmetic average of the estimates of marginal products with respect to  
public capital inside the 17 regions in Spain (Pereira and Roca-Sagales, 2003, Table 3, p 250). 
 
                                                          
16 The cost of the investment is unity, minus the present discounted value of any tax allowances or grants given 
for the asset. 
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The parameters characterizing the financing policy, inflation and depreciation rates 
β ε Pr PKr πr πΚr Le i 
1/3 1/2 1 1 0 0 L 0.05 
 
In this scenario, the firm has a cost of capital net-of-depreciation that is equal to 6.39% and a 
financial cost of 4.42%. If region r faces a productivity handicap equal to 1% (that is 
d[Hr(Kr/ar)α]/[Hr(Kr/ar)α] = -0.01), what regional policy must be implemented in order to 
make the firm equally profitable when location r is compared to other locations? 
 
Table 2 shows to what extent the corporate tax rate must be changed, dτr*, or to what degree 
an investment tax credit, df2r*, a capital grant, dsr*, or publicly provided inputs, dGr*, have to 
be implemented in order to make up for this unfavourable productivity differential.  
 
Table 2:  The regional policy that must be implemented in order to make up for a productivity 
handicap equal to 1% 
 
dτr df2r dsr dGr 
- 0.024 + 0.0222 + 0.0073 + 0.0314 
 
The productivity handicap in region r is fully offset when the corporate tax rate decreases by 
2.4% to 30.6%, or if a tax credit of 2.22% is brought into play, a net-of-corporate-tax capital 
subsidy of 0.73% is granted or further public expenditures of 3.14 cents per unit of private 
capital are implemented. 
 
 
IV. COMPARING REGIONAL POLICIES 
 
  
In order to compare policies whose effects are rather different in kind and which are costly in 
various ways, let us measure the impact of each incentive on the public treasury.17 
Accordingly, this brings to the fore the amount of public resources that have to be spent to 
balance a negative differential in productivity. For an investment project of one monetary 
unit, the cost associated with a capital grant or with publicly provided inputs is just equal to 
the amount of the capital subsidy itself or to the public expense per unit of private capital:  
 
[13]  rs dsC =   and   rG dGC =   
The cost of lowering tax rates, Cτ, corresponds to the tax revenue foregone on the income 
from newly installed capital, throughout its whole lifetime: 
 
[14]  [ ]
)()(
)()(
0
Krrgr
Krru
Krr
CddueCdC Krrgr πδπρ
ττ πδπρτ −+−
−=−= −+−−∞∫   
 
                                                          
17 This is defined in its broadest sense to include regional government treasuries. 
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where CKr 
[ ])()( Krrgre πδπρ −+−−  expresses the nominal profits that increase with inflation, decrease 
in value at the rate of depreciation, and are discounted at the public opportunity cost, ρgr. 
Similarly, the cost of an investment credit (or of an immediate expensing), Cf2r, may be 
expressed in terms of tax revenue foregone on the marginal investment income: 
[15]  rrf dfC 22 τ=  
 
Which policy is less costly to be implemented in order to make up for a regional productivity 
handicap equal to 1%? Table 3 shows how costly are the four instruments of regional policy 
that have been considered, namely lowering the corporate tax rate, decreasing the tax base, 
granting a capital subsidy, and providing new public infrastructures. In order to measure 
Cτ, the public opportunity cost, ρgr, has been set at 4%. 
 
Table 3:  The costs associated with the four instruments of regional policy 
 
Cτ Cf2 Cs CG 
0.0264 0.0073 0.0073 0.0314 
 
What are the main results? As shown in Table 3, granting financial aid or an investment credit 
are the least costly policies. Both instruments require a public expense of 0.73 cents per euro 
of private capital, in order to make the firm equally profitable in spite of a 1% productivity 
handicap in region r.  
 
Conversely, a lowering of the tax base appears to be a bad choice for the policy maker. It 
provides a weaker yield than the first two instruments. This outcome is easily explained. The 
benefits of a tax cut are actually lessened by the following double effect. On the one hand, a 
lower corporate tax rate proportionally reduces the tax savings due to the depreciation 
allowances and accordingly, lowers the net present value of Ar. On the other hand, it produces 
a higher financial cost for the proportion of investment that is financed by debt. 
 
Publicly provided inputs are even costlier. However, because they have the attributes, at least 
partly, of non-excludability and non-rivalness attributes18, these instruments may benefit a 
(potentially large) number of firms. Accordingly, it is impossible to conclude whether 
publicly provided inputs are a worse or a better public device in order to offset a regional 
productivity handicap. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Lagging regions are characterized by unfavourable differentials of productivity. This paper 
has investigated ways in which regional policies can make up for a regional productivity 
handicap. More precisely, four main categories of public aid have been examined: a lower 
corporate tax rate, an investment tax credit, a capital subsidy or publicly provided inputs. 
 
The results suggest that lowering the corporate tax rate is not an efficient policy tool. A 
subsidy net-of-corporate-tax and a decrease of the tax base produce similar effects for the 
                                                          
18 G is not a pure public good. It is subject to congestion.  
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same cost. The setting up of new public infrastructure is costlier but generates productive 
externalities for a number of firms. It is difficult to determine a priori whether it is more 
effective than the other public instruments of policy. 
 
In this paper, the opportunity of implementing a regional policy in order to offset some 
productivity handicaps has not been questioned. This matter is directly linked to some 
considerations in terms of equity and of optimal allocation. The former consideration brings 
to the fore the inter-regional distribution of wealth and is concerned with reducing disparities 
over space. The latter consideration is related to agglomeration economies. All firms 
experience productivity growth as the number or density of geographically concentrated firms 
increases. In order to achieve an efficient allocation, it is urged that these externalities be 
internalised by an adequate public policy. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
The sensitivity of financial cost with respect to the corporate tax rate 
 
The financial costs for the three sources of finance are equal to: 
r)i-1( rDr τρ =  , when the investment is financed by debt; 
)m-(1
)-1(
gr
rir
Rr
im=ρ , when the firm uses retained earnings; 
r
r
Sr
i
θρ )m-1(
)m-1(
dr
ir=  , for new share issues where θr is equal to 1, 
rc-1
1 , 
rτ-1
1 , 
rgr ττ +-1
1  or 
rxτ-1
1 , respectively  under the classical, the partial or total 
imputation, the split-rate (or two-rate) and the deduction systems.  
 
Let β be the proportion of new investment that is financed by debt. (1-β) is the fraction of 
equity finance. If ε is the proportion of equity finance from new share issues, the financial 
cost mix is provided by: 
 
]
)m-(1
)im-(1
ε)-(1+
)θm-(1
)im-(1
β)[ε-(1+)iτ-β(1=ρ
gr
rir
rdr
rir
rrmr  
 
The sensitivity of the financial cost with respect to the corporate tax rate is equal to: 
-i=
τÝ
ρÝ
r
Dr , for debt issue and to 0=
τÝ
ρÝ
r
Rr , when the firm uses retained earnings. In case of 
new share issue, the sensitivity of the financial cost with respect to the corporate tax rate is 
equal to 0=
τÝ
ρÝ
r
Sr , when the classical system or the partial imputation system is implemented; 
and to 
)m-(1
)im-(1-
dr
rir , 
)m-(1
)im-(1
dr
rir  and x
)m-(1
)im-(1-
dr
rir , for the total imputation regime, the two-
rate system and the deduction system respectively. 
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The sensitivity of tax allowances with respect to the corporate tax rate 
 
Different patterns are allowed for tax depreciation. The present discounted value of tax 
allowances is given by the following expressions: 
)e-(1
Lρ
1=A Lρ-
jr
dl
jr , for the straight-line depreciation (L is the lifetime for tax 
purposes); and 
jr
dd ρ+u
u=A , for the declining-balance depreciation (u is the exponential rate at 
which the asset is depreciated). 
 
Other schemes are allowed for tax depreciation, notably the declining-balance system with a 
switch to the linear regime. In this case,  
 
]e-[e
)ρL-(L
e
+]e-[1
b)+(ρ
b
=A Lρ-Lρ-
jrs
-bL
b)L+(ρ-
jr
dz
jrsjr
s
sjr , where 
L
B
=b , B is the 
declining balance rate (equal to two  for the double declining balance) and 
L
B
1)-B(
=Ls is the switchover point. 
 
The sensitivity of tax allowances with respect to the corporate tax rate is given by the 
following expressions: 
)τÝρÝ(
ρL
)e-(1
-)τÝρÝ(
ρ
)(e
=
τÝ
AÝ
rjr2
jr
2
L-ρ
rjr
jr
L-ρ
r
dl
jrjr
, for straight-line depreciation;  
)τÝρÝ(
)ρ+u(
u
-=
τÝ
AÝ
rjr2
jrr
dd , for the declining balance; and 
 
 [ ]
]
ρ
L)ρ-1(e-)Lρ-1(e
ρ)L-(L
e
+
b)+(ρ
1]-1)e+b]L+[([ρ
b)+(ρ
b
[)τÝρÝ(- =
τÝ
AÝ
jr
jr
Lρ-
sjr
Lρ-
jrs
bL-
jr
b)L+-(ρ
sjr
jr
rjr
r
dz
jrsjrs
sjr
 
for the last depreciation scheme associating the declining balance and the linear 
regime. 
 
 
The sensitivity of the capital cost with respect to the corporate tax rate, tax incentives, capital 
grants, publicly provided inputs and the regional productivity differential 
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